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COMMENT ON EPSTEIN, "HOLDOUTS,
EXTERNALITIES, AND THE SINGLE
OWNER: ONE MORE SALUTE TO
RONALD COASE"*
PATRICIA DANZON

University of Pennsylvania

ICHARD EPSTEIN'S thoughtful and thought-provoking article is an ambitious attempt to provide a unified approach to the question of allocation
of rights in a world of nonzero transactions costs. His central thesis is
that "the choice of the legal rule, whether by social command or private
trade-off, typically turns on a trade-off between two separate impediments to complete contingent-state contracts. . . . The first of these is
the problem of externalities. The second is the problem of holdouts...
In my view, the purpose of all legal rules is to minimize the sum of the
costs that are associated with these two forms of bargaining obstacles."1
As Epstein acknowledges, externality and holdout problems have been
extensively examined separately. His contribution is to point out their
pervasiveness and, more important, their inverse relationship. "All imperfections, then, come in only two basic forms. . . . The essential dilemma is that often the effort to counteract one problem will only aggravate the other, for where both are present, they stand in an inverse
relationship with each other."2 The reason is that if consent of affected
parties is not required, externalities may occur. Externalities can be prevented by requiring consent of all affected parties, but only at the cost
of creating the potential for holdouts.
Faced with these potential costs, Epstein argues that courts should* Presented at the John M. Olin Centennial Conference in Law and Economics at the

University of Chicago Law School, April 7-9, 1992. The author is a Celia Moh Professor,
Departments of Health Care Systems and Insurance, the Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania.
1 Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute

to Ronald Coase, in this issue, at 557.
2 Id.

[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXXVI (April 1993)]

?1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/93/3601-0026$01.50
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and apparently usually do-minimize the sum of the costs related to

externalities and holdouts. This, he argues, is equivalent to applying a
"single owner" test. The single owner would allocate resources in a way
that maximizes value (ignoring distributional effects). When applying this
test to situations of potential conflict between multiple parties when coop-

eration between them is precluded, the mandate is to maximize the joint
value of the resources, net of transactions costs.
Epstein proceeds to a normative and positive analysis of various areas
of property law related to "physical invasions," concluding in most cases
that the common-law rules can be explained by his simple rules. The only
limits to the reach of these principles in determining optimal rules arise
from the limits of the insights provided by the single owner test. Epstein
concludes, "In those cases in which a single owner test yields a unique
result, then it is the one that should be followed by the legal system. Yet
in those cases in which the single owner test does not yield clear results,
then there will be no principle that will yield a decisive answer to the
particular problem at hand."3
Epstein's proposed rule-to minimize the sum of costs associated with
externalities and holdouts-is offered as a salute to Ronald Coase. But

at first sight, it seems at odds with Coase's basic message about the
fundamental importance of defining property rights. Externalities presum-

ably exist only where property rights are not defined, whereas holdouts
arise where property rights are defined, as part of the process of determin-

ing the price at which they will be transferred. Following Coase, it would
seem that externalities are always the greater evil, as a general principle,
since if rights are not defined, negotiations over the transfer of resources

to their highest-valued use are unlikely even to get started. In fact, Epstein's discussion refers to situations in which rights are always defined:

the comparison is between alternative allocations. Externalities arise
when one party is entitled to take unilateral actions without the consent
of other affected parties; holdouts arise where consent of all parties is
required.
Paraphrasing, the sole owner principle is equivalent to positing a utilitarian (additive) social welfare function. An additional implicit assumption is that all individuals are risk neutral. The social objective then reduces to maximization of the net value derived from the use of resources,
which is the gross value minus the transactions costs of effecting the
transfer to the highest-valued use. Thus, Epstein's rule is simply a rule
for efficient resource allocation. The "externality" costs are deadweight
3 Id. at 561.
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costs from resource misallocation. With respect to the "holdout costs,"
Epstein implicitly assumes that they are pure waste. A broader view of
transactions and contracting costs would recognize that in a multiparty
world, information may be imperfect. Transactions costs then include the
costs of obtaining and transferring information about resource value in
alternative uses.

This is not a trivial extension since it introduces the possibility that,
from an ex ante perspective, externalities may potentially be bilateral
(that is, affect both parties) and hence that some transactions expenditures should be viewed as productive investments in information rather
than pure deadweight loss, as implied by the term "holdout." The legal
rule should be designed to encourage an efficient investment (by both
parties where relevant) in information and transfer of property to higher-

valued uses. If incremental rather than all-or-nothing changes are possible, the social optimum requires that, at the margin, the "holdout" cost
of additional information is just equal to the reduction in deadweight loss
due to resource misallocation.

Stated in this way, the problem of defining optimal rules to govern
invasions of physical property is exactly analogous to the tort problem
of designing optimal rules to govern personal injuries. The externality
costs are the analog of the injury costs, the holdout or information costs
are the analog of costs of precautions.4 Investing in information reduces
the externality costs, just as investment in precautions reduces accident
costs. Thus, the production framework first applied by Brown5 to the
accident problem applies, to the broad range of contexts reviewed by
Epstein, with minor modifications: output is now the increment in resource value, inputs are information and other contracting inputs.
Pursuing this analogy, assigning the right to the highest-valued user
with no requirement of consent from the other party (for example, owner-

ship of the cave to the owner of the mouth) is analogous to a rule of no
liability. Requiring consent or compensation (or removal of the offending
property in the case of encroachment) is analogous to strict liability.
It is well known that these extreme liability rules lead to a first-best
outcome only for "single activity" accidents, that is, in circumstances
where efficient accident prevention requires care by only one party. Similarly, it can be shown that the extreme property rules are first best only
in circumstances where one type of use is always superior. More gener4 It is noteworthy that the transactions costs associated with generating information are
here elevated to a major role, in contrast to the neglect that such costs typically receive in

models of tort law.

5 John P. Brown. Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1976).
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ally, which use of a property generates the highest value depends on the
circumstances; for example, it may sometimes be more efficient to assign

ownership of a cave to the owner of the surface land above the cave

rather than to the owner of the mouth. Thus, in the more general case,
the external effects can go in either direction (as in bilateral accidents),
and moral hazard or strategic behavior can also be bilateral. Efficiency
requires some investment in information to discover the highest-valued
use.

The analogy between the property rights problem and the more familiar

accident problem may be stated formally. Let Y and L denote the value
of the resource to A and B, respectively, with Y > L. Let x and z denote
investment by A and B, respectively, on negotiating and other activities
related to transfer of resources between them. The cost per unit of x and
z is $1. The probability that a resource is transferred to its highest-valued
use (in this case A) is p(x, z). Let us assume that px > 0 and pz < 0; that
is, x increases the probability of transfer, z decreases the probability, and
so could be called holdout costs. Alternatively, z could affect the per-

ceived value of the resource.

The social welfare problem is to maximize the expected value of the
resource, net of transactions costs:
max SW = p(x, z)(Y - L) - x - z, (1)
x, z

where p can be interpreted as the frequency of transfer of resources to
their highest-valued use.
The first-order condition for the socially optimal level of x is

px(z*)[Y - L] = 1. (2)
Thus, investment in effecting transfer to use A should be incurred up to
the point where the marginal transacting cost is just equal to the expected
gain in increased value of output.
The first-order condition for z is

p(x*)[Y - L] = 1. (3)
Adopting Epstein's assumption that B's negotiating effort is pure waste,
that is, it is known that Y > L and hence that pz < 0, the optimal level
of z (z*) is zero. In the more general case where z generates information
about the value of the resource to B, the formulation of the problem is
more complex and the optimal level of z is not zero.
The issue is, What rights should be assigned to B? Epstein considers
two basic alternatives: (a) the right is assigned to A (presumptively the
highest-valued use) with no consent or compensation requirement, which
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is analogous to the tort rule of no liability, or (b) B's consent (or, by
implication, full compensation) is required, which is analogous to strict
liability.

As in the tort case, these extreme rules generally do not assure a firstbest outcome. Consider first the analog of "no liability," whereby A is
not required to compensate B, that is, any externality is permitted. A
selects x to maximize his private interest PWA:

max PWA = p(x, z)Y - x. (4)
The first-order condition is

Px(0)Y=

1.

(5)

Comparing equation (5) with equation (2), it is clear that if A is not
required to compensate B, A invests in transfer activity to the point
where the marginal transfer cost is equal to the expected gross gain,
ignoring the loss to B. Thus, the allocation of resources to A-type uses
is too high. Since B would have no incentive to invest in z, there would
be no expenditure on holdouts but also no transfer of information about
the loss incurred by B.
Alternatively, under the analog of strict liability, A is required to compensate B or remove any encroachment. B has incentives to spend on z
to increase the perceived value of L = L + dL(z). When B is entitled to
compensation, his incentive is to maximize his expected compensation,
net of negotiation costs:

max PWB = p(x)(L + dL(z)) - z. (6)
z

The first-order condition is

p(x)dLz

=

-1.

(7)

Thus, if the potential payoff to z is positive (Lz > 0), B invests in z to

increase his expected compensation. This is the holdout problem. A's
private objective function is

max PWA = p(x, z)[Y - L - dL(z)] - x, (8)
with first-order condition

p,[Y- L - dL(z)] = 1. (9)
This would be socially optimal only if dL = z = 0. But if z > 0 because
B "holds out" for higher compensation by exaggerating his true value of
L, then the transfer of resources to A-type uses will be suboptimal.

Thus, a rule that requires full compensation or no compensation is
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never first-best optimal if both sides have incentives to spend resources,
A on increasing the probability (frequency) of transfer and B on increasing his expected compensation from the transfer.
Consider first the choice of optimal rule when only these all-or-none
rules are possible. The rule requiring no consent or compensation of B
by A leads to a first best only if A's use imposes no externality on B; if
this condition is not met, then the optimal rule depends on the extent of
moral hazard by both sides, which depends on Px and Lz. A rule of no
consent is the solution that Epstein advocates for caves: assign all rights
to the owner of the mouth, none to the owner(s) of the surface land over
the cave. But if A's use of the cave imposes externalities on B, for example, due to subsidence or disturbance of surface land, and the supply of

caves is not perfectly inelastic, there will be too many caves and too

much interference with surface owners' rights.
By contrast, in the case of encroachments, Epstein assumes an elastic
supply of encroachments (px is high) and therefore opts for the other
extreme rule of assignment of all rights to B. However, like strict liability,

this rule also leads to first-best outcomes only in restrictive circumstances. As Epstein points out, a rule requiring full compensation or
removal of encroachments is more likely to be optimal if the supply of
encroachments is highly elastic. However, the elasticity of supply of z
and the productivity of z in raising L are also factors to be considered.
Potentially efficient transfers will be abandoned if seller demands (L +
dL(z)) are sufficiently large to eliminate all expected return to A, net of
compensation and own bargaining expense:
p(x)[Y - L - dL(z)] - x - 0. (10)
Presumably, this is unlikely in the two-person bilateral monopoly case.
But the likelihood that transactions costs block a value-increasing transfer increases as the number of sellers increases, conditional on the aggregate value of L. In that case, each seller can hold out for the total increase
in value due to the transfer, and the sum6 of these maximum demands
exceeds Y. Thus, ceteris paribus, as the number of sellers increases,
holding constant the aggregate value to the buyer, the expected holdout
costs increase, and the rule requiring unanimous consent becomes increasingly less likely to be even a second best.
As in the case of tort liability for accidents, circumstances are often
such that there is no rule that universally dominates: externalities may
flow in both directions, and optimal investment in negotiations to deter6 For a discussion of this rationale for eminent domain, see Patricia Danzon, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain (1976).
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mine the highest-valued use is nonzero. As with accidents that require
bilateral "care," first-best allocations of property resources may require
more complex rules. The analog of strict liability with a contributory
negligence defense would be that A should compensate B only if z = z*;
that is, B does not exaggerate or act strategically to obstruct the transfer.
The analog of negligence with a contributory negligence defense would
be that A should compensate B if A invests unreasonably (x > x*), pro-

vided that B did not behave strategically (z = z*). Simple negligence

would just drop the condition on z.
These rules place higher information requirements on the courts than
the simple all-or-nothing rules. They require the courts to determine
whether A has engaged in moral hazard or B has acted strategically with
exaggerated demands for compensation. But the information required to
choose between the two simple rules is not trivial-Epstein's assertions
to the contrary notwithstanding.
The analogy between optimal rules for property invasions and optimal
rules for accidents may be extended further. Just as efficient accident
prevention often requires conditions on the rate of harmful activities by
both parties and on the care per unit of activity,7 similarly, efficient allo-

cation of property requires conditions on both ownership and the fre-

quency or extent of use. For example, even if ownership of caves is
optimally assigned to the owner of the mouth, efficiency may require
some restrictions on use, if some uses inflict costs on surface owners. It
would be a simple matter to extend the formal model to include these
additional dimensions. But the conclusion, as in the tort case, is likely to
be that simple rules are even less likely to lead to first-best outcomes,
once the multidimensional and bilateral nature of the interactions is taken
into account.

In my discussion, I have intentionally used the terminology of efficiency rather than the single owner. In multiparty conflicts, the single
owner terminology begs the question of whose preferences this owner
adopts if the preferences of the parties differ. Thus, the single owner
principle is unambiguous only in circumstances in which preferences are
similar and wealth effects of property right assignment are small. More
generally, the allocation of rights affects the distribution of wealth, and
this in turn may affect the valuation of alternative resource allocations.
For example, if the surface owner were assigned the right to the cave,
the highest-valued use might be to leave it undeveloped, if he values very
highly the privacy and tranquility that is destroyed when it is exploited
7 Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980).
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for tourism. The assignment of ownership to the owner of the mouth of
the cave would create, not eliminate, a holdout problem since now the
surface owner would have to negotiate to acquire the right to eliminate

tourism. This underscores the more general point, that the valuemaximizing use of a resource may itself depend on the distribution of
rights. Thus, it may be circular to look to value maximization to determine the optimal distribution of rights, where this distribution has wealth
effects that in turn affect the overall value of resources.

If wealth effects are negligible, then net wealth maximization is either
always or never the correct criterion to apply in principle, depending on
the structure of the social welfare function. The obstacles to its application in practice are the empirical difficulties of determining the relevant
costs and benefits. This ambiguity may hold more generally than Epstein

acknowledges. Thus, whereas Epstein envisages two sets of circum-

stances, those that can and those that cannot be resolved unambiguously
by appeal to the single owner principle, I believe that wealth maximization is in principle always applicable but that empirical difficulties may
preclude clear-cut answers in many cases. In other words, the information requirements for determining the optimal rule vary among contexts,
but are rarely zero or infinite, as Epstein's dichotomy implies. Of course,
Epstein may dismiss more complex rules as hopelessly costly to imple-

ment. That is a judgment about which reasonable people may differ.

Empirical hunches about the efficiency of alternative legal rules are, like
beauty, often in the eye of the beholder.
In summary, Epstein has proposed a useful unifying framework for
evaluating the efficiency of alternative property rules. I believe that more
careful theoretical and empirical analysis is required in order to substantiate the normative conclusions preferring certain rules over others and
the positive conclusions that actual rules conform to these normative

prescriptions. This is in no way a criticism of Epstein's framework;

rather, it is a call for extending and developing it.
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